It is conventional wisdom that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is interlinked. But sometimes conventional wisdom is correct. It continues to be true that a dismantled and destroyed nuclear weapon cannot be proliferated.
All States have a responsibility to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. Member States have taken a number of non-proliferation measures at national level. Export control regimes have been developed. Norway is an active stakeholder in these regimes.
Their guidelines are, however, not universally implemented. We call upon all States to implement effective national export control measures. In doing so they would be better positioned to benefit from peaceful nuclear cooperation.
Apart from the export control regimes the international community is called upon by the UN Security Council resolution 1540 to do its utmost to prevent terrorists from getting access to weapons of mass destruction.
In this relation we call on all States to ratify and implement the Convention on nuclear terrorism adopted by the General Assembly last year. Let me also underline that adequate physical protection of nuclear material is of crucial importance.
More efforts are needed to convert nuclear research reactors in the civilian sector from being fuelled by HEU to being fuelled by LEU. We cannot allow that civilian HEU falls into the hands of terrorists.
Let me reiterate Norway’s firm support to IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards and the Additional Protocol.
While all States have a shared responsibility to contribute to non-proliferation obviously the nuclear weapon states have an additional responsibility in the field of nuclear constraint and disarmament. A range of efforts can be envisioned. Let me mention a few:
1. Some nuclear weapon states are more transparent than others about nuclear issues. We encourage increased transparency across the board. More needs to be done, but many nuclear weapons have been destroyed since 1990. We appeal to the nuclear weapon states to take credit for this by being more transparent about their nuclear programmes.
2. It is our hope that the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty should be renewed and strengthened based on the principles of irreversibility and verification.
3. Negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes should start immediately. But pending this all nuclear weapon states are called upon to declare or reconfirm moratoria on the production of such material. Military excess weapon grade fissile material should be reduced by converting such material into nuclear fuel for civilian purposes. Disarmament can in this way contribute to peaceful use of nuclear energy.
4. The relevant States should make all efforts to enable the CTBT to enter into force. Pending this we expect that a full moratorium on test explosions is observed. In this respect the DPRK is moving in a very wrong and unacceptable direction.
5. There is a certain alert time between the decision point and the trigger point as regards the use of a nuclear weapon. It is the view of my delegation that the longer this alert time, the less are the chances for an accidental nuclear exchange.
6. There is wide-spread support to the concept of nuclear weapon free zones. Yet only one such zone has entered into force with the protocols ratified by the NWS. We must explore, with active participation of the nuclear weapon states, how the other zones can realise their potential.
Finally Madam Chairperson,
USG Tanaka refered yesterday to a certain fatigue in the international community with regard to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. He is probably right, for a number of reasons which I will not discuss on this occasion.
But the wake-up call last Sunday was loud and frightening. The urgency we now sense should inspire us to reach agreement on more resolutions and decisions than we are used to in the First Committee. Resolutions do not save the world. But it is at least a valuable contribution.