Ladies and gentlemen,
The Non Proliferation Treaty is under serious strain. The new challenges make it all the more important that we summon the political will to make the necessary compromises - so that this Review Conference results in a strengthened non-proliferation regime.
The present delay and obstacles encountered at this Review Conference constitute a source of great concern. Only by engaging in a constructive dialogue and co-operation will we succeed. For this to happen we need a political commitment by all States Parties. Failure is not an option.
We are gathered here to reconfirm our commitment to halting the spread of nuclear weapons.
We must build on the work of previous Review Conferences - that is to move closer to establishing a nuclear weapons free world. - A more stable and secure world for all of us.
A new sense of urgency has emerged since the last Review Conference.
The uncovering of clandestine nuclear networks has brought the spectre of terrorist groups equipped with nuclear weapons dangerously close. We must not allow this to happen.
We must use this Review Conference to fill all loopholes in the non-proliferation regime.
The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty is close to universal adherence. Only three countries remain outside. Our goal is to bring them into the Treaty as non-nuclear weapons states. We urge them to do so.
In the meantime, we need to identify pragmatic ways of moving them closer to the NPT regime pending their accession as non-nuclear weapon states.
For the first time a State Party has announced its withdrawal from the Treaty and its intention to go nuclear. Leaving the NPT should never be seen as a practical formality.
We consider all States Parties, as well as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, to be bound by their NPT obligations. Leaving the NPT cannot be without consequences.
There are justified concerns about the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran. There is an urgent need to resolve this problem. This can only be achieved by satisfactory reporting of nuclear activities and full co-operation with the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Security Council resolution 1540 is crucial to our efforts to prevent non-state actors from acquiring nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. This Conference should call for the full implementation of this resolution.
This Conference should also reaffirm that export controls are an essential instrument of non-proliferation. We must reject the false assumption that export controls impede co-operation and the transfer of technology. The Conference should also welcome the supporting role of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in upholding the non-proliferation regime.
Some countries fear that our deliberations may not put sufficient emphasis on the disarmament dimension of the NPT, as opposed to the non-proliferation dimension. We should strive for balance, but they should not be held hostage of one another.
Simple logic dictates that the more nuclear weapons and material that are available, the greater the chance that they will fall into the wrong hands, even into the hands of global terror networks. All responsible States must work hard to avoid that.
We should therefore achieve a moratorium on the production and use of highly enriched uranium for civilian use, with a total ban as a long term objective. We strongly support international initiatives for securing and removing fissile material not under adequate control. The G8 Global Partnership is vital in this regard.
Disarmament and non-proliferation support each other. Norway considers irreversible and verifiable disarmament to be one of the most important non-proliferation measures.
An early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty would be an important impediment for any nation contemplating to go nuclear. It would be essential in preventing the development of new weapons. It would underscore our common aim to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in security policies.
We urge all nations to ratify this crucial instrument as quickly as possible. In the meantime we expect that the nuclear weapons States will abide by their test moratoria.
Since the end of the Cold War, there have been considerable cuts in nuclear arsenals.
The Strategic Offensive Treaty between the US and the Russian Federation is a welcome contribution to strategic stability as well as disarmament. We need more and deeper cuts, however, including cuts in non-strategic nuclear weapons.
Irreversibility and transparency are fundamental principles for enhanced confidence in the disarmament process. Removing and destroying nuclear weapons is part of an effective and sustainable non-proliferation strategy.
Increased transparency - through regular reporting on steps taken in implementing disarmament obligations - is essential to sustain the credibility of the NPT. Reporting is an obligation, not a choice.
Since the last Review Conference we have received a number of stark reminders of how crucial verification is to the credibility of the non-proliferation regime.
This conference should send a clear message that the IAEA Additional Protocol is part of the verification standard. Countries that have not ratified this instrument should do so without delay. The Protocol should become mandatory for all States Parties.
At the same time, the IAEA must be fully equipped and given the necessary financial resources to carry out its verification mandate. This will be a priority for us when Norway enters the Board of Governors this fall.
This Review Conference should call for making all relevant IAEA instruments on nuclear security and safety universal. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material must be strengthened.
Civilian use of nuclear energy and technology must become fully resistant to proliferation.
We must devise better mechanisms for controlling the nuclear fuel cycle. The recent report from the IAEA expert group on Multinational Nuclear Approaches should guide us in these efforts.
It is high time we start negotiating a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes (FMCT). Such a Treaty would be a key factor in preventing a new nuclear arms race. Norway calls for the necessary political will to immediately start negotiating an FMCT.
Pending an FMCT, all nuclear weapons States should reaffirm their moratoria on the production of fissile materials. Those who have not yet done this should do so now.
An FMCT is clearly part of our disarmament agenda. Ideally, such a treaty should also address the issue of existing stocks. That should be our objective.
In the meantime, nuclear weapons States should place fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA arrangements for disposition.
The NPT is a core pillar of our collective, global security. At the same time, the NPT lacks an institutional machinery to deal with new and emerging challenges.
There is an urgent need for a mechanism that facilitates dealing with important issues and challenges as they arise. Meeting every five years is not enough.
This Review Conference offers us an opportunity to roll back the erosion of confidence in the NPT. We must walk the extra mile to achieve a positive, balanced and forward-looking outcome.
We have for our part circulated our main positions on the key issues. We also co-operate closely with like-minded countries in order to contribute constructively to the outcome of this Conference.
We must all be ambitious in our approach to the Review Conference. The status quo is not enough. I appeal to all of you to take this opportunity to move forward towards the goal of a more stable, safe and secure world. We must agree on a final declaration in which we recommit ourselves to the principles of the NPT, also in a new global security environment.